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We experimentally study the impact of preference uncertainty on voter turnout and electoral 
efficiency in a participation game. We find higher participation rates when the electorate is 
informed about the level of support for various candidates than when group sizes remain 
uncertain. Moreover, despite higher free riding incentives majorities win more often than 
minorities. In aggregate, whether or not group sizes are known hardly affects welfare. We 
also distinguish between allied and floating voters and our data show that the lower turnout 
under uncertainty can be attributed to floating voters participating less. Finally, our results 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For many people the goal of elections is to determine the electorate’s preferences and to 
allocate political power accordingly. To achieve this, high participation is often considered to 
be desirable. For example, Lijphart (1997) argues that low turnout is a serious democratic 
problem  because it usually involves unequal turnout,  causing  unequal political  influence. 
Indeed, if voter turnout is voluntary it is not obvious that the result of an election will reflect 
the  electorate’s  preferences,  even  if  every  vote  is  cast  sincerely  for  the  most  preferred 
candidate. In fact, some models of costly voluntary voting yield equilibria where turnout in 
the majority is lower than in the minority (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983). One reason is that 
the incentive to free ride on the costly participation of other group members is higher for 
voters in the majority. As a consequence, the minority’s preferences are over-represented, 
which may result in welfare losses for society as a whole. 
  In  order  to  properly  evaluate  the  ‘high  turnout  is  better’  claim, a  welfare analysis  is 
needed. Given that there are costs related to casting a vote, changes in turnout affect welfare 
directly. One needs to analyze the trade-off between this effect and the welfare consequences 
of a change in the majority’s probability of winning the election (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 
1983;  Ledyard.  1984).
1  The  result  of  such  a  welfare  analysis  may  well  be  that  higher 
participation results in lower welfare. In a model of simple majority voting with uncertainty 
about costs and other voters’ preferences, Börgers (2004) shows that voluntary participation 
dominates compulsory voting in terms of welfare. Hence, there may indeed be circumstances 
in which it is in a society’s interest to sacrifice benefits derived from the election outcome in 
favor of saving voting costs. 
  In this paper, we study the welfare implications of endogenous voter participation. We do 
so in an environment of preference uncertainty, i.e., voters do not know the exact levels of 
support  for  the  candidates.  This  is  caused  by  a  group  of  ‘floating  voters’,  who  remain 
uncertain about the candidate to support until the election takes place. Note that this kind of 
incomplete  information  is  quite  realistic  for  most  elections.
2  In  fact,  if  preferences  were 
known  there  would  be  no  need  for  an  election,  one could  simply  apply  a  decision  rule. 
Uncertainty about the electorate’s level of disagreement, defined as the size of the minority 
(Feddersen and Sandroni, 2004), has indeed long been recognized as an important feature of 
                                                
1 More generally, costs involved in the provision of a public good should be taken into account when evaluating 
the welfare consequences of its provision (e.g., Ledyard and Palfrey, 1994, 1999, 2002). 
2 E.g., in 2004 the pollster Populus categorized 35% of the UK electorate as ‘floating voters’ (Times Online, 
07.09.2004, “Boost for Kennedy as Blair and Howard slip”)  
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many  elections  (Daudt,  1961).  Empirical  studies  document  the  large  impact  that floating 
voters can have on an electoral outcome (Campbell, 1960; Kramer, 1971; DeNardo, 1980). 
  A possible consequence of uncertainty in elections is that costly participation may be low. 
For example, uncertainty about the size of the electorate yields low equilibrium participation 
levels (Myerson, 1998), as does uncertainty about voting costs and other voters’ preferences 
(Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985). Moreover, given preference uncertainty expected equilibrium 
participation decreases in voting costs, the size of the electorate, and the expected level of 
disagreement (Goeree and Großer, 2004). The efficiency trade-off between the lower turnout 
costs on the one hand and the effect of lower turnout on the majority’s probability of victory 
on the other, remains a topic to be investigated. There is theoretical evidence for certain 
environments, however, that pre-election information aimed at decreasing uncertainty, e.g. 
through polls, can increase turnout and stimulate the majority (minority) to participate less 
(more), with negative welfare implications (Goeree and Großer, 2004).
3 
  Our  goal  is  to  investigate  the effects  of  preference  uncertainty  on  turnout  levels and 
welfare. This investigation will take place at two complementary levels: theoretically and 
experimentally. Both utilize the framework of a participation game (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 
1983, 1985; hereafter PR83, PR85). Laboratory experiments are also a useful complement to 
empirical studies on voter turnout (Matsusaka and Pada, 1993), because they allow one to 
control the environment in which the decision is made. In particular, we will take advantage 
of this method by exerting control over distinct ‘types’ of voters and ‘closeness’ of elections. 
  With regard to voter types, we will be able to distinguish between ‘allied’ and ‘floating’ 
voters. The former have a stable alliance to a candidate. Floating voters, on the other hand, 
are often described as having a weaker party identification, because they (expect to) benefit 
less from a preferred candidate winning than allied voters, or are less interested in politics 
(Campbell, 1960). A second difference between voter types is that a floating voter does not 
decide on whom to support until shortly before the elections and often switches from one 
candidate to the other. As a consequence, all voters are uncertain about the level of support 
for the two candidates when deciding whether or not to vote. It is this uncertainty (and the 
way it differs between allied and floating voters) that we are interested in. Laboratory control 
allows us to let allied and floating voters derive the same benefits from winning the election 
                                                
3 Lohmann (1994) shows how (costly) pre-election political action may give biased aggregate information in 
equilibrium, with negative effects for welfare.  
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(i.e., correct for possible differences in benefits between the two types) and therefore to focus 
purely on the uncertainty effect.
 4 
  The second focus of this research is closeness. It is important to start by clearly defining 
what  closeness  means  in  this  context.  In  particular,  empirical  studies  measure  ex  post 
closeness: the difference in the number of actual votes cast by supporter groups (Matsusaka 
and Pada, 1993). In contrast, our experiment allows us to impose ex ante closeness. We 
determine the ‘level of disagreement’ in the electorate by controlling group size differences. 
Information about this level is typically not fully available outside the laboratory, and can 
only be approximated by polls and election outcomes. Moreover, we control the information 
regarding closeness given to the voters before the election. In this way, we are able to directly 
isolate the impact of uncertainty about other voters’ preferences on turnout and welfare for 
various realizations of a preference distribution in the electorate. 
  Our  experimental  results  show  that  participation  is  20%  lower  when  preferences  are 
uncertain than when the electorate’s level of disagreement is known. We can attribute this 
completely to floating voters, who vote less when preferences are uncertain. Allied voters are 
not affected by this information. Moreover, participation of informed voters increases with 
the electorate’s level of disagreement: turnout is high when groups are of equal size and low 
when minorities  are  smallest. When voters are uncertain about other voters’ preferences, 
turnout is in between these two extremes. The welfare effects that we observe depend on the 
ex ante closeness. Preference uncertainty decreases electoral efficiency when the level of 
disagreement  is  low  and  increases  efficiency  when  disagreement  is  high.  In  aggregate, 
welfare is barely affected by whether or not the electorate is informed about the level of 
disagreement. 
 
The participation game used in our experimental design underlies many theoretical studies of 
turnout. In the original version of this game (PR83), there are two (or more) groups with sizes 
known to all voters. Everyone decides privately whether or not to ‘participate’ in an action, 
where participation is costly. Participation is beneficial to every member of one’s own group 
and harmful to members of other groups: the (higher) reward is given to the group with the 
higher  number  of  ‘participants’.
5  The  participation  game  simultaneously  combines  a 
between-group conflict for the higher reward with a within-group conflict, where each group 
                                                
4 Note that it may be in the interest of both types, allied and floating voters, not to reveal their preferences before 
elections. Such behavior could also create preference uncertainty but is not the focus of our study. 
5 The participation game assumes private values. For examples of voting games involving common values see 
e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1999).  
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member has an incentive to free ride on costly participation by her co-members. Typically, 
multiple Nash equilibria occur. In some equilibria the minority has a higher probability of 
victory than the majority. For certain parameter configurations, equilibria with substantial 
levels  of  participation  exist,  even  in  large  electorates  (PR83).  With  cost  and  preference 
uncertainty, however, turnout levels are very low and the ‘paradox of voting’ persists (PR85). 
  The experimental literature on participation games is scarce. Bornstein (1992) reports the 
first experiment on participation behavior in small groups. Subsequent studies investigate 
variations in group and electorate size (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996a; Hsu and Sung, 2002); 
the effect of proportional representation vs. winner-takes-all elections (Schram and Sonne-
mans, 1996a); the role of group identification and communication (Schram and Sonnemans, 
1996b; Goren and Bornstein, 2000); and the introduction of payoff uncertainty under various 
voting costs (Cason and Mui, forthcoming). Other recent studies extend the model to allow 
for  endogenous  information  about  other  voters’  turnout  (Großer and  Schram,  2004); and 
endogenous  policy  making  and  group  formation  (Großer  and  Giertz,  2005).  In  all  these 
experiments,  relatively  high  participation  is  observed,  albeit  lower  than  in  most  general 
elections around the world. Typically, the standard (Bayesian-) Nash equilibrium concept 
finds little empirical support. However, Goeree and Holt (forthcoming) and Cason and Mui 
(forthcoming) show that logit equilibria can account for some of the data. To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to experimentally investigate the effects of uncertainty about 
the level of disagreement in a participation game. 
  The  organization  of  the  remainder  of  this  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  2  defines  the 
participation game with preference uncertainty (PU) and discusses its equilibria. We will 
distinguish  between  Bayesian-Nash  and  logit  equilibria  for  the  game.  In  section  3,  we 
describe  the  experimental  design and derive specific equilibria for  the  parameters  of  our 
experiment.  Section  4  presents  our  experimental  results  and  compares  them  to  the 
equilibrium predictions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE PU-PARTICIPATION GAME  
 
GROUP STRUCTURE 
Consider a democracy in which elections are decided by simple majority rule and ties are 
broken by a coin-toss. The electorate consists of two groups, each supporting one of two 
exogenous candidates. We will distinguish between two scenarios. In the first, there are no  
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alliances between voters and candidates. Each voter can belong to one supporter group in one 
election and to the other group in the next. The second scenario is where there is a number of 
fixed voters in each group. This number is equal and commonly known. One interpretation is 
that  these  are  ‘allied’  voters,  whereas  the  others  are  ‘floating’  voters.  Because  of  this 




The players in the participation game (PR83) are the E (risk neutral) voters in an electorate, 
each seeking to maximize the own payoff. Each voter belongs to one of two supporter groups 
B A i , = . Let integer  1 ≥ i N ,  B A i , = , be the number of voters in i, with  E N N B A = + . The 
notation  i j ,  B A i , = , will be used to represent voter i j∈ . Each voter i j  faces a strategy set 
consisting of two pure strategies  } 1 , 0 { ∈
i j v , where  1 =
i j v  denotes participation in favor of 
candidate i    and  0 =
i j v  denotes abstention. A mixed strategy profile for  i j  is given by the 
probabilities of participation 
i j q  and abstention 
i j q − 1 , where  1 0 ≤ ≤
i j q . All voters in the 
electorate make their decisions simultaneously. Aggregate participation in  B A i , =  is 
 
      ∑ ≡
i i j j i v V                     )   1   (  
 and, for later use, aggregate participation by other voters in i than  i j  is denoted by 





i v V V − ≡
− .                    )   2   (  
Payoffs are determined by the outcome of the election and the cost of voting. Normalizing the 
individual benefit from having one’s preferred candidate win (lose) the election to 1 (0), the 
election outcome determines an (expected) benefit for voter  i j ,  B A i , = , given by 
 
,  
               
1
0


























=                  )   3   (  
where  i V−  denotes aggregate participation in the group  i j  does not belong to. Note that 
) , ( i i j V V w
i −  is non-decreasing (non-increasing) in its first (second) argument and symmetric  
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to the groups,  (.,.) 1 (.,.)
i i j j w w − =
− . Furthermore, assume identical participation costs to all 
voters within the range 
           ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ c ,                        )   4   (  
i j ∀ ,  B A i , = . The payoff for any voter  i j ,  B A i , = , is then given by 
 
           c v V V w
i i i j i i j j − = − ) , ( π .                 )   5   (  
We now introduce preference uncertainty (PU), thus creating a Bayesian-Nash game. PU 
is formally characterized by common knowledge about: 
 
(i)  a minimal group size denoted by integer  1 ≥ i N , which implies a maximal group size 
= −i N   i N E − , with  i N ≤ 1 i N < 1 − ≤ E ,  B A i , = ; 
(ii) a discrete probability distribution over all possible electoral compositions  ) , ( i i N N −  from 
the set  } { ) , ( ),..., 1 , 1 ( ), , ( B A B A B A N N N N N N − + , with  0 )   .   ,   .   ( > prob  for each element in 
the set. 
 
Throughout, we will only consider the symmetric case, where  1 ≥ = −i i N N . 
 
(BAYESIAN-) NASH EQUILIBRIA 
PR83 analyze the participation game without PU and, among others, derive two types of 
Nash equilibria. For  2 / 1 > c , the only equilibrium is in pure strategies where nobody votes. 
In contrast, when  2 / 1 < c  there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, unless  B A N N = , in 
which case the only such equilibrium is one where everyone votes.
6 Moreover, for  2 / 1 < c  
PR83 also derive ‘totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy equilibria’ (denoted by ‘ ) ~ , ( q q -
equilibria’) where all voters within one group vote with probability  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ q  and all voters in 
the other group with  ) 1 , 0 ( ~∈ q . They derive two such equilibria. First, for the symmetric case 
B A N N = , two totally quasi-symmetric equilibria exist if c is large enough. Both involve 
equal voting probabilities in both groups  ) ~ ( q q = . No such equilibrium exists for low costs. 
Second,  without  restriction  to equal  group sizes, if  c is  small enough, two  totally  quasi-
symmetric  mixed  strategy  equilibria  exist  with  the  members  of  one  group  voting  with 
probability q and those in the other group with probability  q q − =1 ~ . 
  The  derivation  of  equilibria  for  the  PU-participation  game  is  a  straightforward 
modification  of  that  in  PR83  and  PR85.  Here,  we  provide  the  optimization  conditions 
                                                
6 The case where  2 / 1 = c  is straightforward, but laborious.  
  7
involved. A more detailed analysis with examples is presented in appendix A. In section 3, 
we will present the equilibria for our experimental parameters. Throughout, we will follow 
PR83 and PR85 in assuming risk neutrality. 
  In the equilibrium analysis, the central condition is that a player will vote with certainty if 
the expected payoff is higher than the expected payoff of abstaining. Formally, voter  i j , 
B A i , = , will vote with probability 1 iff 
 
   [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ],   0         1 = > =
i i i i j j strat size j j strat size v Exp Exp v Exp Exp π π        )   6   (  
and  will  abstain  with  probability  1  if  the  reverse  is  true.  Expectation  operators  refer  to 
strategic uncertainty (strat ) and PU (size).
7 Elaboration gives 
 















− ,      )   7   (  
where  ) (x prob   is  the  probability  that  electoral  composition  ) , ( x E x −   occurs,  and 









− = + + =   gives  voter  i j ’s  probability  of  being  pivotal, 
given i’s own group size  x. The first of these terms gives the probability that  i j  can turn a tie 
into a victory, and the second the probability that she can turn a defeat into a tie. For fixed x, 
)   7   (   simply  reduces  to  the  equilibrium  condition  for  the  ‘standard’  participation  game 
(PR83). Note that the expected payoff from voting is always negative for  2 1 > c , implying 
that a risk neutral voter will abstain in this case. Hence, for high costs, the only Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium is for every voter to abstain. 
  Condition  )   7   (  can be used to determine pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria for the 
PU-participation game with  2 / 1 < c . Appendix A (proposition A1) gives a comprehensive 
overview of these equilibria for various values of c. For example, if 2c is smaller than the 
probability that both groups are of equal size (or that there is one voter more in the own 
group), then one equilibrium in pure strategies is for everyone to vote. This is an intuitive 
extension of the PR83 full participation equilibrium discussed above. There are other pure 
strategy equilibria with some voters participating. The pure strategy equilibria that we derive 
for our experimental parameters will be described in section 3. 
                                                
7 PR85 refer to the uncertainty about group sizes (preferences) as 'strategic', because it enters the participation 
decision of voters. We agree and only use a different terminology for notational clarity.  
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Next, consider equilibria in totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategies. A necessary and 
sufficient condition for Bayesian-Nash equilibria in such strategies to exist is that each voter 
i j ,  B A i , = , is indifferent between participation and abstention (i.e., condition  )   7   (  holds as 
an equality). Since in the experiment we use a symmetric group size distribution we focus on 
symmetric  ) , ( q q -equilibria. Then, elaboration and specification of  )   7   (  implicitly defines 
best response q: 
 
. 2         ) 1 (
1
1
                             
) 1 (
1
  ) (
2 2 1 2
] 1 , 1 min[
0
2 1 2

































































       )   8   (  
The first term in the large square brackets gives the (binomial) probability that there is a tie of 
k  votes between the  x E −  members in the other group and the  1 − x  other members of  i j ’s 
own group ( i j  can turn a tie into a victory). The second term gives the (binomial) probability 
that the other group outvotes  i j ’s co-members by one vote ( i j  can turn a defeat into a tie). 
Numerical calculations show that these equilibria exist for a variety of parameter values (see 
appendix A for examples). 
  Until now, we have allowed for PU without distinguishing between allied and floating 
voters. All voters were assumed to choose a candidate on election eve, under the condition 
that at least Ni voters would choose i. This describes a world with only floating voters. We 
are  now  assuming  that  the  minimal  group  of  Ni  voters  has  determined  their  choice 
beforehand.  Hence,  a  situation  of  PU  appears,  with  the  minimal  group  representing  the 
number of allied voters in i. There is a subtle, but important difference in the information set 
of the two voter types: each floating voter has private information about the candidate she 
supports,  which  she  can  use  to  (subjectively)  update  the  probability  distribution  of  the 
electorate’s composition. Allied voters, on the other hand, must rely on the common prior 
distribution. Because of this difference, we consider mixed strategy equilibria with distinct 
voting probabilities for the two voter types. 
  In our analysis (and experiments) we use a binomial distribution in which a priori each 
floating voter belongs to  B A i , =  with equal probability  5 . 0 = p  (cf. Börgers, 2004). We 
restrict our analysis to the symmetric case with an equal number of allied voters in each  
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group:  1 ≥ = B A N N .
8 We again refer to appendix A (proposition A2) for an overview of all 
pure strategy equilibria of the game. As in the case without allied voters, the only equilibrium 
when  2 / 1 > c  is for everyone to abstain and a full participation equilibrium exists if 2c is 
smaller than the probability of a tie or a win by 1 vote. Once again, other equilibria in pure 
strategies exist for specific cost levels. 
For mixed strategy equilibria, we focus on quasi-symmetric cases were all allied voters 
participate  with  the  same  probability  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ a q   and  all  floating  voters  with  the  same 
probability  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ f q . A necessary and sufficient condition for Bayesian-Nash equilibria in 
such strategies to exist is that each allied voter and each floating voter is indifferent between 
participation and abstention. Elaboration and specification of (7) as an equality gives implicit 
functions for the best responses  a q  and  f q  that can be solved numerically for a wide range of 
parameters.  These  implicit  functions  and  some  examples  of  equilibria  are  presented  in 
appendix A. 
 
QUANTAL RESPONSE EQUILIBRIA 
Goeree and Holt (forthcoming) and Cason and Mui (forthcoming) show that quantal response 
equilibria, in particular logit equilibria, predict behavior in experimental participation games 
better than (Bayesian-) Nash equilibria do. Here, we show how such equilibria can be derived 
for the PU-participation game. In the next section, we will present specific equilibria for the 
parameters of our experiment. 
  Starting point for the quantal response analysis is the comparison of expected payoffs for 
voting  and abstaining described in condition (6). A stochastic term 
i j µε  is added to the 
expected payoff of each decision (vote or abstain) to allow for the possibility that voters 
perceive these payoffs subject to noise. It includes an error parameter  0 ≥ µ  common to all 
and 
i j ε  as a realization of  i j ’s individually specific random variable, which is identically and 
independently distributed per voter and decision (cf. Goeree and Holt, forthcoming). Voter  i j  
will participate iff the expected payoff from voting is higher than that of abstaining: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
0 1 0       1
i i i i i i j j j strat size j j j strat size v Exp Exp v Exp Exp µε π µε π + = > + = ,    )   9   (  
                                                
8 The generalization to asymmetric cases through unequal minimal group sizes or p ≠.5 is straightforward, 
however, more laborious best response conditions and notations are needed.  
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where  ε ’s  superscript  ‘1’  (‘0’)  refers  to  the  realization  of  the  random  variable  in  the 
stochastic term that is added to the payoff from voting (abstaining). In the absence of noise (µ 
= 0), (9) reduces to condition (6) for a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Hence, the equilibria 
described above are a limit case of the quantal response equilibria described here (McKelvey 
and Palfrey, 1995; Goeree and Holt, forthcoming). 
  For µ > 0 it follows from  (9) that voter  i j  will vote iff 
 









i i i i
i i
j j strat size j j strat size
j j
v Exp Exp v Exp Exp
.      )   0 1   (  
Denoting the distribution function of the difference 
1 0
i i j j ε ε −  by F, this gives the probability q 
that voter  i j  will vote: 
 








 = − =
=
µ
π π 0 1
i i i i j j strat size j j strat size v Exp Exp v Exp Exp
F q ,       )   1a 1   (  
or, after elaboration (cf. condition 7), 



























x V V prob x V V prob














) ( .   )   1b 1   (  
This equation describes the voting probability q as a ‘noisy best response’ to the expected 
payoff difference between voting and abstaining. Assuming symmetry not only within but 
also  between  groups  (because  all  voters  face  exactly  the  same  decisions)  and  using  the 
binomials in eq. (8), the right hand side of  )   1b 1   (  is a function of the probability, q, that a 
randomly  drawn  other  voter  will  vote.  A  quantal  response  equilibrium  (McKelvey  and 
Palfrey,  1995)  for  some  specification  of  error  distribution  F  occurs  if  the  participation 
probability on the right hand side is equal to the q that shows up on the left hand side. This 
can be found numerically for specific values of the error parameter µ. 
The  quantal  response  equilibrium  for  the  case with  allied  and floating  voters  can  be 
derived in a similar way. Each type is symmetric across groups due to the symmetric group 
size distribution. Then, to calculate the noisy best responses for allied and floating voters,  a q  
respectively  f q , two equations similar to  )   1b 1   (  have to be solved simultaneously. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
PROCEDURES AND TREATMENTS 
The  computerized
9  experiment  was  run  at  the  laboratory  of  the  Center  for  Research  in 
Experimental Economics and political Decision making (CREED), University of Amsterdam. 
288 undergraduate students were recruited in 12 sessions of 24 subjects. Each session lasted 
about 2 hours (cf. appendix B for the read-aloud instructions). Earnings in the experiment 
were expressed in tokens. At the end of a session token earnings were transferred to cash at a 
rate of 4 tokens to one Dutch Guilder. Subjects earned an average of 56.01 Dutch Guilders (≈ 
€ 25.42). 
In each session, the 24 subjects were randomly divided into two electorates of 12 voters. 
Each  electorate  consisted  of  two  groups.  There  was  no  interaction  of  any  kind  between 
subjects in different electorates, and this was known to all of them. Given that we do not 
know the structure of the correlations across observations, we treat the electorate as the only 
independent  unit  of  observation.  Hence,  each  session  provides  us  with  two  independent 
observations. 
The experimental design employed a full 2×2 between subject factorial design with 3 
sessions (6 electorates) per cell. A first factor (‘preference (un)certainty’) manipulated the 
information about the level of disagreement (i.e., realized group sizes). This information was 
either given at the beginning of each round (‘informed’) or not at all (‘uninformed’, which 
yields the case of preference uncertainty). The second factor (‘voter alliance’) manipulated 
the presence of allied voters. In one treatment (‘floating’), there were no allied voters, while 
in the other (‘mixed’), there were 3 allied voters in each group that stayed in their groups 
throughout the session. Floating voters were reallocated to groups at the beginning of each 
round, whereas allied voters were assigned to a group once and for all at the beginning of the 
first round. Each subject was either an allied or floating voter throughout the session and 
knew her type from the beginning of the first round. Note that floating voters were always 
reallocated within the same electorate. 
 
PREFERENCE UNCERTAINTY (PU) 
Preference (un)certainty and voter alliance were both varied in a between subject design. To 
create the possibility of PU, we varied group sizes in a within subject design. In any given 
                                                
9 The experimental software was programmed using RatImage (Abbink and Sadrieh, 1995).  
  12
round, each group i consisted of a minimum of  3 = i N  voters and a maximum of  9 = i N . 
Any integer group size  { } 9 ,..., 4 , 3 ∈ i N  was possible. The randomization used to determine 
group sizes proceeds in the following two steps: 
 
•  Step 1:    3 subjects are put into each group. Each subject in the electorate has an equal 
chance of being chosen and of being allocated to either group. 
•  Step 2:    The remaining 6 subjects are independently and randomly allocated, with 
equal probability for each group. 
 
This procedure was known to all subjects. The way it is applied is different for our ‘floating’ 
and ‘mixed’ treatments. In ‘mixed’ sessions, step 1 determined the 6 subjects to take the role 
of  allied  voters  and  their  group  allocation.  This  step  was  performed  only  once,  at  the 
beginning of the first round; step 2 took place at the beginning of each round and reallocated 
the 6 floating voters. In ‘floating’ sessions, both steps were performed at the beginning of 
each round and, importantly, subjects did not know at which step they were allocated to the 
groups. Notice that step 2 produces a binomial distribution of group sizes with  5 . 0 = p , 
where electoral composition (6-6) occurs with probability .3125, (5-7) and (7-5) each with 
.2344, (4-8) and (8-4) each with .0938, and (3-9) and (9-3) each with .0156. 
Each session consisted of 100 decision rounds.
10 The distribution of the composition of 
the electorate across rounds was varied in a random, but predetermined manner (see appendix 
C for the complete sequence). 33 rounds use the composition (6-6), 23 use (5-7), 22 use (7-5), 
9 use (4-8), 9 use (8-4), 2 use (3-9), and 2 use (9-3). Whether subjects knew the actual group 
sizes when making their decisions depended on the preference (un)certainty treatment. In the 
‘informed’  sessions,  the  actual  ‘own’  and  ‘other’  group  sizes  were  announced  at  the 
beginning  of  each  round.
11  Note  that  subjects  in  ‘uninformed’  faced  the  same  decision 
problem  in  each  round,  because  they  never  knew  the actual  level  of  disagreement  when 
making  their  decisions.  Moreover,  ‘uninformed’  allied  and  floating  voters  had  different 
information about group sizes. An allied voter knew that there are ‘at least 3’ (‘at most 9’) 
voters in each group. A floating voter, on the other hand, knew that there ‘are at least 4’ 
voters  in  her  own  group  and  at  most  8  in  the  other.  As  a  consequence,  in  the  ‘mixed’ 
treatment allied voters had an expected ‘own’ group size of 6, whereas for floating voters 
                                                
10 Due to a computer crash, one session had to be stopped after 94 rounds. 
11 Groups were labeled ‘own’ and ‘other’ to avoid floating voters associating with either group.  
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Bayesian updating yields an expected ‘own’ group size of 6.5. When there are only floating 
voters, this expectation is 6.25. 
 
PAYOFF PARAMETERS 
In each round, each member of the winning group received revenue of 4 tokens and each 
member  of  the  losing  group  received  1  token.  As  the  cost  of  participation  was  1  token 
(independent  of  a  subject’s  type),  negative  payoffs  were  avoided.  Table  1  summarizes 
treatments and parameters. 
 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF TREATMENTS AND PARAMETERS* 






Uninformed Floating      UF  12  0  yes 
Uninformed Mixed       UM    6  6  yes 
Informed Floating       IF  12  0  no 
Informed Mixed       IM    6  6  no 
*All treatments had 100 rounds and electorates of 12 voters, with a minimum (maximum) of 3 (9) in each 
group. A victory (loss) payed 4 (1) to each voter in the group and the individual costs of voting were equal to 1. 
We have observations from 6 independent electorates per treatment. 
 
EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS 
For  these  parameters,  we  can  derive  (Bayesian-)  Nash  equilibria  and  quantal  response 
equilibria as described in section 2. Following PR83 we conclude that ‘everybody votes’ is 
the pure strategy equilibrium in ‘informed’ when both groups have equal size 6.
12 For the 
other (asymmetric) realizations of group sizes where voters know the level of disagreement 
there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. For both uninformed treatments (UF and UM) it 
follows from propositions A1 and A2 in appendix A that there is no pure strategy Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium with full participation.
13 For UF, from proposition A1 we know that the 
only Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pure strategies are those, where one voter of either group 
participates and all others abstain. From proposition A2 we conclude that no Bayesian-Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies exist for UM. All in all, pure strategy equilibria do not provide us 
with testable predictions about our treatment effects. 
We use eqs.  )   8   (  and (11b) to numerically derive (Bayesian-) Nash equilibria in totally 
quasi-symmetric  mixed  strategies  and  quantal  response  equilibria  for  our  treatments.  As 
discussed in section 2, the former equilibria are a limit case of the latter, for  0 = µ . At the 
                                                
12 Normalizing revenue to 1 (0) in case of a victory (defeat), we have c = 1/3. 
13 This follows from  3125 . 2 > c (with normalized c = 1/3), which is the probability of equal group sizes.  
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other extreme, when µ  → ∞ the equilibrium  probability  of voting approaches 0.5, which 
represents pure random behavior. For the quantal  response, we derive logit equilibria  by 
choosing a double exponential distribution for error distribution F (McKelvey and Palfrey, 
1995). For equilibrium prediction, we use estimates for error parameters µ  reported in Goeree 
and Holt (forthcoming).
14 They determine logit equilibria for data presented in Schram and 
Sonnemans (1996a) for an experimental participation game with symmetric group sizes equal 
to 6 and benefits and costs similar to the parameters used in our experiment. The model fits 
early round data best for  8 . = µ  and later round data for  4 . = µ . Therefore, we derive logit 
equilibria for our treatments using  4 . = µ  and  8 . = µ  in addition to the (Bayesian-) Nash 
equilibria (µ = 0).
15 For ease of presentation, we will refer to these equilibria as Eµ, for µ ∈{0, 
0.4,  0.8}. E.g., E0 refers  to the (Bayesian-)  Nash  equilibrium. Appendix D gives a table 
providing a full overview of these equilibria per treatment. Here we summarize them by 
focusing on three characteristics: participation probabilities, the probability of victory, and 
efficiency. 
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the equilibrium probabilities of voting. For the informed 
treatments in figure 1, these are weighted averages for the distinct electoral compositions. 
 









































Figure  1  shows  participation  probabilities  per  treatment  and  noise-level.  Note  that  in 
informed (IF and IM) there is no difference in equilibrium participation between allied and 
floating voters, because both know the group sizes prior to making their decisions. For this 
                                                
14 We intend to confront our experimental data with comparative statics derived from equilibrium analysis. For 
this reason, we cannot estimate µ using our own data and take the value found to derive equilibrium predictions. 
Instead,  we  use  the  exogenous  values  found  elsewhere.  In  section  4.6,  we  will  give  maximum  likelihood 
estimates of µ for our data, however. 
15 Because we normalized our revenues to 1 (0) in case of a victory (defeat) for the calculations, we normalized 
µ to 0.4/3 and 0.8/3, respectively. Our presentation in the main text refers to non-normalized parameters.  
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reason, we present the equilibrium results as one case. In E0, average expected turnout is 
substantially higher when there is a mix of allied and floating voters with PU (53% in UM) 
than when all voters are floating and face PU (10% in UF) or when all voters are informed 
(11% in IF/IM). This difference is entirely due to the allied voters, who vote with very high 
probability (94%) in the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Floating  voters in UM on the other 
hand, vote at a low rate of 12%, which is similar to voters in the other treatments. After 
introducing noise, the logit equilibria show that the turnout probabilities of all voter types and 
conditions converge and are hardly distinguishable (30-31% in E.4, and 38-39% in E.8). These 
probabilities increase with  µ  and are higher than the low probabilities derived in E0 for all 
voters except allied voters in UM.  
  Figure 2 shows equilibrium turnout as a function of group size (left panel) and ex ante 
closeness (right panel) for informed voters. Note that ex ante closeness is determined by the 
level of disagreement. 
 
  FIGURE 2: EQUILIBRIUM PARTICIPATION OF INFORMED VOTERS 
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The left panel shows that in E0 the voting probability decreases monotonically with group 
size when voters are informed about the level of disagreement. This is a consequence of 
increased free riding incentives. When adding noise, the monotonicity disappears. Both logit 
equilibria as a function of group size are an inverted U-shape. The highest voting probability 
in E.4 (33%) is found for group size 5 and in E.8 (40%) for equal group sizes of 6. For each µ, 
the turnout probability is higher for voters in a minority than in the opposing majority, though 
the difference decreases with µ (this can be seen in the left panel of figure 2 by observing that 
the participation curve becomes more symmetric around group size 6 as µ increases). Finally, 
for any group size, the probability of voting increases with  µ . The right panel in figure 2  
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shows that turnout (slightly) decreases with the level of disagreement in E0 and increases as 
minorities become larger in E.4 and E.8.
16  
  From the probabilities of voting, we can derive the equilibrium probability that a group 
will win the election. Because informed minority voters participate at a higher probability 
than their majority opponents, the former may achieve a victory more often than the latter. 
Figure 3 gives the equilibrium probabilities of winning the election per treatment, noise-level, 
and group size. In E0 with informed groups (left panel), minorities indeed have a higher 
probability of winning the election than majorities. When noise is introduced, the smaller 
difference in equilibrium participation by voters in opposed groups together with an overall 
increase in the level of participation, turns the tide in favor for the majority: the group size 
effect  dominates  the  free  riding  effect  and  the  majority  has  a  (substantially)  higher 
equilibrium  probability of victory. Finally,  the middle and right panels of figure 3  show 
victory probabilities when voters do not know group sizes at the time they vote. In this case, 
voters participate with the same probability, since they cannot respond to unknown group 
sizes (though allied and floating voters may vote at different rates). Hence, majorities win 
more often. Moreover, the figures confirm that treatment effects diminish as  µ  increases. 
And, when we introduce allied voters (UM), in E0 minorities have a lower probability of 
winning than when all voters are floating (UF). This is a direct consequence of the high 
probability with which allied voters vote (figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 3: EQUILIBRIUM VICTORY PROBABILITIES 
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16 For equal group sizes appendix D shows a second Nash equilibrium, not presented in the figure.  
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These voting and victory probabilities can be used to calculate voters’ expected payoffs, 
which  determine  the  electoral  efficiencies  in  equilibrium  (PR83).  Figure  4  shows  these 
efficiencies per treatment, noise-level, and level of disagreement. Efficiency is calculated as 
the electorate’s aggregate payoff in equilibrium, divided by its socially optimal (efficient) 
total payoff. For unequal group sizes, surplus is maximized when one voter in the majority 
participates and all other voters abstain. For example, for electorates with group sizes (3-9) or 
(9-3), the efficient aggregate payoff is  1 4 9 1 3 − × + × 38 =  [similarly, 35 for (4-8)/(8-4), and 
32 for (5-7)/(7-5)]. For equal group sizes (6-6), it is efficient if nobody participates, in which 
case total payoff is  30 4 6 1 6 = × + × . 
 
FIGURE 4: EQUILIBRIUM EFFICIENCY 
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Note from figure 4 that once again the treatment effect is strongest in E0. When voters are 
informed about group sizes, efficiency is lowest (73%) when the level of disagreement is 
lowest and monotonically increases with the size of the minority to 96% when there are 6 
voters  in  each  group.  This  pattern  occurs  in  E0,  because  overall  expected  participation 
decreases (right panel, figure 2) and the majority’s probability of winning increases (left 
panel, figure 3) in the level of disagreement. Compare this to the treatments with PU. In UF 
efficiency in E0 is very high (96%) for equal group sizes, whereas intermediate values of 
efficiency between 85% and 87% are observed for all other levels of disagreement. In UM, 
efficiency in E0 is low (between 73% and 79%) for all levels of disagreement. This is because 
allied  voters  participate  extensively.  When  noise  is  introduced,  the  differences  across  
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treatments are minor. In all cases the efficiency curves are U-shaped and show intermediate 
values (83-88% for E.4  and 82-86% for E.8). 
  Obviously,  the  (comparative  static)  predictions  we  derive  depend  on  the  equilibrium 
concept used and level of noise assumed. We summarize these theoretical results (TR) below. 
Confronting  them  with  our  experimental  results  (ER)  will  allow  us  to  determine  which 
equilibrium predicts the comparative statics best. 
 
TR1:  Each equilibrium predicts that turnout will be virtually the same in IF, IM and UF. The logit 
equilibria predict that turnout will also be similar in UM, E0 predicts higher turnout for UM. 
TR2:   Introducing  noise  substantially  increases  participation  in  UF,  IF,  and  IM.  In  UM  the 
relationship between participation and the level of noise is non-monotonic. 
TR3:  In E0, participation by informed voters decreases in group size. The relationship between 
group size and turnout is non-monotonic in E.4 and E.8. 
TR4:  In E0, E.4 and E.8., voters in the minority participate more than those in the opposing majority. 
TR5:  In E0, participation by informed voters decreases in the level of disagreement. The reverse 
holds in E.4 and E.8. 
TR6:  In UM, allied voters participate much more than floating voters in E0. Both types participate at 
similar levels in E.4 and E.8. 
TR7:  In E0, informed minorities win more often than informed majorities. In E.4 and E.8 the reverse 
holds. In both treatments with PU, the majority wins more often than the minority irrespective 
of µ. 
TR8:  In E0, electoral efficiency is highest when the level of disagreement is highest and voters are 
informed or there are only uninformed floating voters. Average electoral efficiency in E0 is 
lowest in UM and highest in UF. 
 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The presentation and analysis of our experimental results is organized along the same lines as 
the equilibrium predictions, above. First, we discuss observed participation rates (sections 
4.1-4.3), then victory probabilities for minorities and majorities (4.4), and finally electoral 
efficiency (4.5). In 4.6, we analyze how the logit equilibrium fits our data. Our statistical tests 
in  4.1-4.5 are  based  on  nonparametric  statistics  as  described  in  Siegel  and  Castellan,  Jr. 
(1988). For the reasons mentioned above all our tests will be conducted at the electorate level 
(qualitative conclusions are based on one-tailed tests).  
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4.1 AGGREGATE PARTICIPATION RATES 
Figure  5  shows  participation  rates  averaged  over  blocks  of  20  rounds each.  We  observe 
higher participation rates when group size information is provided than when preferences are 
uncertain. This holds for all blocks of rounds: the rate is always higher in IF (IM) than in UF 
(UM).  Though  all  treatments  start  at  similar  levels, a  difference  in  participation  rates  of 
approximately 10%-points exists between treatments where voters are informed and those 
with PU from the second block onward for both the IF-UF and IM-UM comparisons. 
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 1:  Information  about  the  level  of  disagreement  increases 
participation. 
SUPPORT.  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney  tests  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  difference  in 
average participation in favor of higher rates in informed at the 5% significance level for the 
IF-UF comparison and at the 10% level for IM-UM. 
 
Figure  5  also  shows  higher  participation  rates  in  the  mixed  treatments  than  in  the 
corresponding treatments with only floating voters. The differences start out relatively small, 
but increase to 7%-points for each information treatment in blocks 3-5. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 2:  In  the  presence  of  allied  voters,  informed  voters  participate 
more in later rounds. 
SUPPORT. Across all rounds, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of  no  difference  for  the  UM-UF  or  IM-IF  comparisons  at  the  10%  significance  level. 
Considering blocks 3-5 only, rates are significantly higher in IM than in IF (5% level) but the 
difference UM-UF is not significant (10% level).  
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We can compare these first two experimental results (ER) to theoretical results TR1 and TR2, 
derived from our equilibrium analysis. TR1 (that participation is the same across treatments 
in E.4 and E.8 , and only higher in UM in E0) is rejected by both ER1 and ER2. We will discuss 
these two discrepancies between our data and the equilibrium predictions in section 4.6. As 
for TR2, we have the more general observation that participation levels in figure 5 are much 
closer to the ones predicted by the logit equilibria E.4 and E.8 than to those predicted by the 
(Bayesian-) Nash equilibrium E0 (figure 1). 
 
4.2 PARTICIPATION RATES PER GROUP SIZE AND LEVEL OF DISAGREEMENT 
Figure  6  shows  aggregate  participation  rates  per  group  size  (left  panel)  and  level  of 
disagreement (right panel). 
 
FIGURE 6: PARTICIPATION RATES 
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Note: The bars in both figures indicate participation rates when voters know their group size (left panel) and 
level of disagreement (right panel). In the left panel, the lines with markers show participation levels for voters 
who are unaware of the actual group size and level of disagreement. The remaining lines are taken from figure 2 
and show participation levels in the equilibria E0, E.4 and E.8. 
 
For uninformed voters there is no reason to expect participation to vary across size because 
subjects face PU. This is confirmed in the left panel. When informed about the level of 
disagreement, subjects participate most for group size 6 (IF: 49%; IM: 58%).  
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 3:  When informed about the level of disagreement, participation is 
highest when group sizes are equal. 
SUPPORT.  A  Friedman  two-way  analysis  of  variance  by  ranks  cannot  reject  the  null 
hypothesis of no  difference in participation rates across  group sizes  in UF or UM (10%  
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significance), but rejects  it for IF (IM) at the 1% (0.1%) level. Pairwise  comparisons  of 
participation rates across group sizes using Wilcoxon signed ranks tests show that in IF (IM) 
the null hypothesis of no differences is rejected in favor of higher rates in groups of 6 in 
comparison to any other size at least at the 5% (10%) significance level. 
 
The left panel of figure 6 also shows (slightly) higher participation by voters in the majority 
than in the opposing minority. This gives: 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 4:  When informed about the level of disagreement, participation is 
not higher for minority members. 
SUPPORT. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in 
participation rates between minority members and the opposing majority members at the 10% 
significance level for any level of disagreement in IF and IM. 
 
ER3 and ER4 can be compared to TR3 and TR4, which essentially means comparing the 
equilibria to our data in the left panel of figure 6 (note that these equilibria are copied from 
the left panel of figure 2). Once again, we observe that observed participation seems much 
closer to the logit equilibria than to E0 because of the non-monotonic relationship with group 
size (TR3). Contrary to ER4, however, all of the equilibria we considered predicted higher 
participation rates for the minority members. Our experimental results do not support the idea 
that the free riding incentive is larger in majorities (this is a third discrepancy between the 
equilibria and our data, to be addressed in 4.6). 
  The right panel in figure 6 relates participation rates of informed voters to the level of 
disagreement and compares them to the equilibrium predictions. A general conclusion is that 
the content of information about other voters’ preferences has a strong impact on turnout: 
observed participation increases (substantially) in the level of disagreement. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 5:  Participation  by  informed  voters  increases  in  the  level  of 
disagreement. 
SUPPORT. A Page test for ordered alternatives rejects the null hypothesis of no difference in 
participation rates across levels of disagreement in favor of increasing participation rates at 
the 0.1% significance level for both IF and IM. 
 
Relating this result to TR5 provides additional support for the logit equilibria in comparison 
to E0.  
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4.3 PARTICIPATION RATES OF ALLIED AND FLOATING VOTERS 
Figure 7 compares average participation rates of allied and floating voters for the mixed 
treatments. Rates for  the  treatments without allied  voters are shown for comparison. We 
observe slightly  higher  participation (4%-points) by floating than by allied voters in  IM. 
Allied  voters  participate  substantially  more  than  floating  voters  when  facing  PU  (13%-
points). The difference is not statistically significant, however. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 6A: When there are allied voters, they participate at similar levels 
as floating voters. 
SUPPORT. Neither in IM nor in UM can Wilcoxon signed ranks tests reject the null hypothesis 
of no difference in rates between allied and floating voters at the 10% significance level. 
 
Comparing ER6A to TR6, we see that the large difference in turnout of allied and floating 
voters predicted by the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for UM is not supported statistically. The 
negligible differences predicted by E.4 or E.8 are supported. 
 




























Allied Floating UF IF
 
Another  way  to  see  the  participation  rates  in  figure  7  is  by  noting  that  participation  is 
generally 40% or more, but that floating voters facing PU vote at a rate of about 30% (both in 
UF and in UM). Recall that uninformed floating voters have extra information about their 
own group size, compared to informed and allied voters. This may cause them to vote less. 
We conclude that the lower participation rates in UF and UM compared to their informed 
counterparts (cf. ER1 and figure 5) are caused by floating voters, behaving differently in 
these distinct cases. This conclusion is tested in the following result. 
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 6B:  Floating voters participate more when informed about the level 
of disagreement. Preference uncertainty has no effect on allied 
voters. 
SUPPORT. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
in participation rates of allied voters in the IM-UM comparison (10% significance level), but 
rejects it for floating voters in favor of higher rates for informed in both the IF-UF and IM-
UM comparisons (both 5% level; cf. ER1). 
 
4.4 VICTORY PROBABILITIES 
In each of the three equilibria considered,  the participation  rate for informed  voters was 
higher in the minority than in the opposing majority. In E0, the difference was large enough to 
give  the  minority  a  higher  probability  of  winning  the  election  than  the  majority.  ER4, 
however, showed that realized participation rates are not higher in the minority. This means 
that the majority achieves a victory more often. This is visible in Figure 8, where we show 
the realized fractions of majority victories. For comparison, the probabilities implied by E0, 
E.4  and  E.8  as  well  as  the  efficient  solution  are  also  shown.  We  add  the  (6-6)  case  for 
comparison, defining the majority victory rate as 50%. 
 
FIGURE 8: VICTORY RATES 
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Note: Because the victory rates in the logit equilibria for UF and UM are almost identical (cf. figure 3), we only 
present them for UF, here. 
 
The  figure  shows  that  majority  victory  rates  are  always  larger  than  50%  and  (with  one 
exception) increase in group size. For the uninformed treatments, this is a direct consequence 
of equal average participation rates across group sizes (since subjects cannot respond to what  
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they don’t know). For the informed treatments, this follows from ER4. Comparing the left 
and right panels, note that only for a majority of 7 voters do the victory rates depend on 
whether or not other voters’ preferences are known. An informed majority of 7 has a 17%-
point (13%-point) higher probability of beating the minority of 5 in the IF-UF (IM-UM) 
comparison.
17 These observations give: 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 7:  Majorities have a higher probability of winning the elections 
than the opposing minorities. 
SUPPORT.  This follows from the discussion above. 
 
Comparing this result to TR7, we once again observe that the logit equilibria predict the 
comparative statics better than E0. 
 
4.5 ELECTORAL EFFICIENCY 
As outlined in section 3, electoral efficiency is calculated as an electorate’s realized earnings, 
divided by its socially optimal (efficient) earnings. Table 3 gives realized efficiencies and 
their standard deviations. The data are pooled across the two voter alliance treatments, since 
virtually no differences in patterns are observed for this variable. 
 
TABLE 3: ELECTORAL EFFICIENCY 
Treatment  Uninformed  Informed 
Level of 





















.846  .826 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 8:  Preference uncertainty has little effect on aggregate electoral 
efficiency.  With  informed  voters,  efficiency  decreases  in  the 
level of disagreement. 
SUPPORT. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
in aggregate efficiency between uninformed and informed at the 10% significance level. With 
                                                
17 For a majority of 7, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference in victory rates 
in favor  of  higher  rates in  informed, for  both  the  IF-UF  (5%  significance  level)  and  IM-UM (10% level) 
comparisons. No significant differences are found for majority sizes of 8 and 9 (10% level).  
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regard  to  the  level  of  disagreement,  a  Page  test  for  ordered  alternatives  rejects  the  null 
hypothesis of no difference in efficiencies across these levels in favor of the order 3 > 4 > 5 > 6 
for informed at the 1% significance level, but not for PU (10% level). 
 
The experimental result that electoral efficiency decreases with the level of disagreement for 
informed voters contradicts prediction TR8 for E0. It is closer to the patterns shown in E.4 and 
E.8 in figure 4, though we only observe the U-shape predicted by these logit equilibria in the 
case with preference uncertainty. 
  To conclude, the impact of preference uncertainty on electoral efficiency varies with the 
actual level of disagreement in the electorate. Compared to the case with PU, information 
about  this  level  is  disadvantageous  (advantageous)  for  efficiency  when  group  sizes  are 
(un)equal. Aggregated across all levels of disagreement, PU has little effect on efficiency. 
These  experimental  results  have  implications  for  the  effects  that  opinion  polls  have  on 
electoral efficiency. We will discuss these effects in the concluding discussion. 
 
4.6 INTERPRETING THE EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS 
The observed comparative statics in ER1-8 together with theoretical predictions TR1-TR8 
provide  strong  evidence  in  favor  of  the  logit  equilibria  E.4  and  E.8,  compared  to  the 
(Bayesian-)  Nash  equilibrium  E0.  However,  we  made  three  observations  that  cannot  be 
justified by the logit predictions either: (i) higher participation in IF than UF and in IM than 
in UM (TR1 and ER1); (ii) higher participation in IM than in IF (TR1 and ER2); and (iii) 
participation rates are not higher in an informed minority than in the opposing majority (TR4 
and ER4). One possible explanation for these discrepancies lies in our assumption that the 
error rate µ is equal across treatments and environments. In the experiment, however, some 
situations  may  appear more difficult to  subjects  than others, causing  more  noise in  their 
responses.  Alternatively,  noise  may  be  accompanied  by  systematic  behavior  that  is  not 
accounted for in the equilibrium concepts we use. We will evaluate both explanations. To 
start with the possibility that error rates vary across treatments and environments, figure 9 
shows for each of our treatments how the logit equilibrium changes with the noise parameter 
µ (including E.4  and E.8; cf.  appendix D). Recall that µ  =  0  yields the (Bayesian-) Nash 
equilibrium and that as µ → ∞ the equilibrium probability of voting approaches 0.5, which 
represents pure random behavior. 
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FIGURE 9: LOGIT EQUILIBRIA 
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Note: The lines give the logit equilibria for varying µ from 0 to 2 and the discrete cases 10, 100, and 1000. The 
latter  show  up  as  a  ‘jump’  upwards,  with  participation  probabilities  close  to  0.5.  The  symbols  show  the 
maximum  likelihood  estimates  µ ˆ   for  rounds  21  to  100,  the  corresponding  numbers  give  the  observed 
participation rates. ‘All’ represents the  µ ˆ  for the (weighted) average participation of the treatment. 
 
The lines in figure 9 give equilibrium participation probabilities as a function of µ. We can 
use  these  levels  to  find  the  µ ˆ   (i.e.,  find  the  logit  equilibrium)  that  best  predicts  our 
observations. This is equivalent to determining maximum likelihood estimates of µ  for our 
treatments.
18 To allow for an initial phase of confusion and orientation we estimate µ for 
observations after round 20.
19 The symbols with the numbers in figure 9 give the location of 
                                                
18  Denote  by  qµ  the  logit  equilbrium  (or  equilibria)  for  µ.  Let  qo  be  the  observed  participation  rate  for  n 











= , which is 
maximized for qµ = qo, if such a µ exists (otherwise a corner solution maximizes the Log-likelihood). The Log-
likelihoods of our estimates for the various treatments are presented in appendix D. 
19 Many experimental games show a decrease in noise over the rounds, commonly attributed to learning (e.g., 
McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Goeree and Holt, forthcoming; see Anderson et al., 2004, for the relation between  
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our experimental observations on the equilibrium line. For example, in UF, we observed a 
participation  rate  of  29.7%.  This  is  a  logit  equilibrium  level  of  turnout  for  µ ˆ =0.39.  As 
expected from the observed participation rates, the maximum likelihood estimates  µ ˆ  appear 
to be quite diverse, often outside of the range [0.4, 0.8], implying distinct levels of noise in 
the best response functions. One possible (ex post) explanation for the three discrepancies 
between our data and the logit predictions is that treatments where the estimated level of 
noise  is  higher  were  more  difficult  decision  making  environments  for  our  subjects.  An 
alternative explanation is that the discrepancies are deviations through systematic behavior 
not captured by the ‘pure’ logit equilibrium. For the three cases, we suggest the following 
possible explanations: 
 
Discrepancy (i):  The drop in participation for the uninformed treatments (TR1 and ER1) 
was shown to be attributable to floating voters (ER6B). Floating voters may be reacting to 
their larger expected ‘own’ group size. Because this Bayesian updating is included in the 
logit equilibrium calculations, it cannot by itself explain the discrepancy. However, floating 
voters  may  overweigh  this  information,  which  would  lead  to  the  pattern  of  behavior  we 
observe. 
Discrepancy (ii):  Allied voters interact repeatedly in the mixed treatments. If they try to 
‘coordinate’  across  rounds,  the  stage  game  equilibria  described  in  section  2  are  not 
applicable. Repeated interaction yields higher turnout in experimental participation games, 
even  in  a  finitely  repeated  setting  (Schram  and  Sonnemans,  1996a,b).  Our  UM  and  IM 
treatments are best seen as a mix between a partners and strangers design (Andreoni, 1988), 
i.e, we have partially repeated interaction. This may explain the observed higher participation 
in IM than IF (TR1 and ER2). 
Discrepancy (iii): Another potential source of variation in noise is group size. Recall that a 
higher  participation  rate  in  majorities  than  in  the  opposing  minorities  was  our  third 
discrepancy (TR4 and ER4). Figure 9 and appendix D show higher estimates of the error 
parameters for the majority. Alternatively to more noise, an explanation may be that some 
                                                                                                                                                  
directional learning and the logit equilibrium).  If learning reduces errors,  one  might expect subjects in the 
uninformed treatments to learn faster, because they make the same decision in every round. Moreover, informed 
subjects may learn faster about electorates with higher levels of disagreement due to the binomial distribution of 
group sizes. Learning may also be quicker for the case where voters are in a majority, which occurs more often 
than being in a minority. Contrary to what we observe in our experiment (figure 9 and appendix D), this would 
imply lower noise for higher levels of disagreement and for majorities. Instead, it appears in our data that the 
major changes in participation occur in the first 20 rounds in all treatments, suggesting that learning is not bound 
to a particular electoral composition or one’s ‘own’ situation. 
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subjects have altruistic preferences. In linear public goods experiments, contributions often 
increase  with  group  size  (Isaac  and  Walker,  1988;  Isaac  et  al.,  1994).  This  cannot  be 
explained by a logit equilibrium, unless payoffs are adjusted to allow for altruism (Anderson 
et al., 1998). Whether this result carries over to participation game experiments is a matter to 
be investigated. Assuming that some subjects direct pure altruism towards all voters in the 
electorate,  one  would  expect  minority  (majority)  members  to  decrease  (increase)  their 
participation compared to the logit predictions to support the more efficient outcome. Our 
data suggest this as a reasonable conjecture.
20 
 
In this paper, it was not our aim to enrich the logit model to capture every discrepancy with 
observed data. We stress the fact that the logit equilibrium, even with homogeneous noise 
levels  across  treatments,  substantially  improves  the  (comparative  statics)  predictions 
compared to the (Bayesian-) Nash model. This supports previous findings for experimental 
participation games (Goeree and Holt, forthcoming; Cason and Mui, forthcoming) and shows 
that the logit equilibrium remains a reliable predictor also for richer voting environments. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Theoretical work on simple majority voting suggests that information about group sizes prior 
to elections, e.g. through polls, can have negative effects on welfare in certain environments 
(Goeree and Großer, 2004). The reason is that expected overall participation may increase 
and voters who are reinforced in their beliefs of being part of the majority (realize they are in 
a minority) may be stimulated to participate less (more) than before. We extend this literature 
by theoretically and experimentally analyzing participation games and comparing situations 
where the electorate only knows the a priori distribution of preferences to those where it is 
informed  about  the  exact  realization  of  group  sizes.  Our  theoretical  predictions  for  this 
comparison depend strongly on the equilibrium concept used and the decision environment. 
For the logit predictions, though participation (efficiency) probabilities are higher (lower) 
when  voters  are  informed  about  other  voters’  preferences  than  when  they  are  not,  these 
                                                
20 In a model with (some) voters who care about the welfare of their own group, Feddersen and Sandroni (2004) 
derive comparative static predictions very similar to those of the logit equilibrium derived here. For example, 
they predict that participation is increasing in the level of disagreement, and that the participation probability is 
higher in the minority than in the majority, but that the majority wins more often. Due to distinct assumptions 
between their model and our design (for example, the probability of being pivotal is zero in their model), we 
cannot directly test their predictions, however. For an empirical test of their model see Coate and Conlin (2005). 
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differences are minor across voter types (i.e. allied and floating voters) and environments. For 
the (Bayesian-) Nash predictions, the effect of full information on participation and efficiency 
is much stronger and depends on voter types and environment. For example, participation of 
uninformed allied voters is much higher than of any voter in any other situations. This high 
equilibrium turnout causes serious efficiency losses. 
  The  experiment  allowed  us  to  measure  the  effect  of  information  about  other  voters’ 
preferences on participation and efficiency and at the same time to select the equilibrium 
concept that best predicts behavior in the various environments. We find strong evidence in 
favor of the (comparative statics) predictions of the logit equilibria in comparison to the 
(Bayesian-)  Nash  equilibria.  The  quantal  response  equilibrium  seems  to  capture  many 
qualitative features of voter behavior. 
  Our experimental results show higher overall participation when information about other 
voters’ preferences is provided. Moreover, in line with the logit predictions but contrary to 
the Nash predictions, (informed) majorities achieve a victory more often than their opposed 
minorities. The difference between participation in electorates with and without preference 
uncertainty is most striking for equal supporter group sizes. This yields severe welfare losses 
in case the level of disagreement is known, because voters participate much more than is 
socially  optimal.  However,  overall,  information  about  other  voters’  preferences  has  no 
systematic effect on welfare. 
  When distinguishing between allied and floating voters in our experiment, we find that 
the  floating  voters  are  the  cause  of  the  observed  lower  participation  in  electorates  with 
preference uncertainty. This can be attributed to their private information about their own 
preference, rather than to an unstable preference or, as often argued, to them having lower 
stakes  in  the  election  outcome  than  allied  voters.  Our  laboratory  control  allowed  us  to 
distinguish allied from floating voters on one dimension: the instability in their preferences, 
causing uncertainty about the level of disagreement in the electorate. We kept the stakes 
across types constant. Our experimental results show that this uncertainty per se is enough to 
yield lower turnout for floating voters, with consequences for the electoral outcome. 
  Overall, this study shows that the impact of information about other voters’ preferences, 
e.g. through polls, on participation and efficiency depends on the underlying, actual group 
sizes.  In  this  respect,  our  experimental  results  suggest  that  the  publication  of  polls  will 
increase electoral efficiency only when the tendency is that the level of disagreement is low, 
but will harm efficiency when it is high. Of course, our study is limited to some extent. For 
example, we ignored the possibility  that poll outcomes may be  biased  by strategic voter  
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responses, and hence may be less informative than in our study. Future research should also 
relax some of the assumptions in our set-up (e.g., using larger electorates with a larger variety 
of group sizes, asymmetric size distributions, endogenous poll outcomes, and allowing for 
voters with ‘non-selfish’ preferences). Nevertheless, we report important evidence showing 
that (a) participation decreases as a consequence of uncertainty about others’ preferences; (b) 
when polls reveal supporter group sizes in the electorate, participation increases strongly with 
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BAYESIAN-NASH EQUILIBRIA OF THE PU-PARTICIPATION GAME 
This appendix provides Bayesian-Nash equilibria for the PU-participation game with and without allied voters. 
We derive pure strategy equilibria (propositions A1 and A2) and present numerical estimations of totally quasi-
symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for varying choices of parameters. We define total aggregate participation 
by  i i V V V − + ≡ . Our presentation starts with equilibria for the PU-participation game without allied voters and 
then proceeds to the case with allied voters. First, proposition A1 describes all pure strategy Bayesian-Nash 
equilibria. 
 
PROPOSITION A1 (pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the PU-participation game without allied voters):
1 
(i)  If  2 1 > c ,  the  only  Bayesian-Nash  equilibrium  in  pure  strategies  is  0 =
i j v ,  i j ∀ ,  B A i , =   (nobody 
participates). 
(ii)  If  2 ) ( i i N N prob c − = ≤   { 2 ) 1 ( + = ≤ −i i N N prob c }  for  E   even  {odd},  there  is  a  Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies with  1 =
i j v ,  i j ∀ ,  B A i , =  (everybody participates). 
(iii)  If  2 ) 2 / ( V x prob c = =  {     2 ) 2 / ( 2 ) 2 / ( V x prob c V x prob c = ≤ ∧ = = } for  E  even {odd}, there are 
Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pure strategies with  1 =
i j v ,  i j ∀ , and  1 =
−i j v  for some or none of the voters 
in  i − ,  i i − ≠  (everybody in i participates and possibly some in  i − ). 
(iv)  If  2 1 < c , then for  E  even {odd} any turnout level V ,  E V < < 0  { 2 / 0 E V ≤ < }, is an outcome of a 
Bayesian-Nash  equilibrium  in  pure  strategies  if  ] ) ( , ) ( [ max min V c V c c∈   with  min ) (V c   ( max ) (V c )  is  2 / 1  
times the probability that an abstainer (a participant) can change the election outcome by participating 
(abstaining) {for turnout levels  E V E < < 2 /  such equilibria exist for some specification of symmetric 
group size distributions}. 
(v)  No other Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist. 
 
Proof  to be found at (http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/person.php?i=3) 
 
 
Totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy equilibria ((q,q)-equilibria) can be derived numerically using eq. (8). 
Figure A1 depicts examples of such equilibria for the PU-participation game without allied voters. The left 
panel varies the electorate size  } 25 ,..., 12 , 11 { ∈ E , using fixed and equal minimal group sizes of 5 voters in each 
group ( 5 = = B A N N ) and an equal probability of being in either group for each voter (binomial distribution 
with p = 0.5). 
 
FIGURE A1:  ) , ( q q -EQUILIBRIA IN THE PU-PARTICIPATION GAME WITHOUT ALLIED VOTERS AND WITH BINOMIAL 
GROUP SIZE DISTRIBUTION 
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Participation  probabilities  are  shown  for  voting  costs  5 / 1 = c   and  3 / 1 = c .  Participation  is  quite  low  for 
3 / 1 = c  and slightly decreasing in  E . For  5 / 1 = c , we find  ) , ( q q -equilibria only for  13 ≥ E . With lower 
                                                
1 The trivial but laborious cases with  2 / 1 = c  are not discussed in this appendix.  
ii
voting cost, participation is always higher as compared to higher costs and also decreasing in E. Aside from 
these equilibria with low levels  of participation,  we find  two ‘high’-participation  ) , ( q q -equilibria:  one for 
11 = E  when  3 / 1 = c  and one for  13 = E  when  5 / 1 = c . The right panel of figure A1 shows equilibrium 
participation probabilities when the electorate size is kept constant ( 20 = E ), but the minimal group sizes are 
varied and equal across groups ( 9 ,..., 2 , 1 = = B A N N ). As in the left panel, we use p = 0.5 and show participation 
for  5 / 1 = c  and  3 / 1 = c . We observe higher participation for the lower voting costs. Moreover, participation 
appears  quite  constant  across  different  minimal  group  sizes.  Again,  we  find  a  ‘high-participation’  ) , ( q q -
equilibrium, in this case for  9 = = B A N N , when  5 / 1 = c . 
 
Next, we consider pure and totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for the PU-participation game 
with allied voters. Let F denote the number of floating voters:  i N E F 2 − ≡ . Proposition A2 gives pure strategy 
equilibria using a binomial group size distribution (p = .5). It is a straightforward extension of proposition A1. 
We only need to account for the differences in beliefs that allied and floating voters have about group sizes. 
 
PROPOSITION A2 (pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the PU-participation game with allied voters): 
Assume an equal number of allied voters  1 ≥ = B A N N , and binomially distributed floating voters with  5 . = p . 
(i)  If  2 1 > c ,  the  only  Bayesian-Nash  equilibrium  in  pure  strategies  is  0
, , = =
f i a i j j v v ,  a i j , ∀ ,  f i j , ∀ , 
B A i , =  (nobody participates). 
(ii)  If 
 













c , the only Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is  = a ji v ,   1
, =
f i j v ,  a i j , ∀ , 
f i j , ∀ ,  B A i , =  (everybody participates). 
(iii)  Other, more specific Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist. 
 
Proof  to be found at (http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/person.php?i=3) 
 
 
Similar to proposition A1(i), proposition A2(i) states that all voters abstain if the voting costs are too high. As 
propositions A1(ii), A2(ii) is an intuitive extension of the full participation equilibrium for  i i N N − =  analyzed 
in PR83. If all voters have high enough (compared to costs) expectations that both groups are of equal size 
respectively that there is one voter more in the own group, a full participation equilibrium exists. 
 
Next, we consider totally quasi-symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for the game with allied and floating voters. 
Elaboration and specification of condition (6) for this case gives implicit functions for the best responses  a q  
(A1a) and  f q  (A1b): 
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To understand theses conditions, consider  )   a 1 A   (  ( )   b 1 A   (  is a similar application to floating  voters). The 
equation elaborates the condition that the probability of being pivotal is equal to  c 2  for a mixed strategy to be a 
best response. The left-hand side of  ) A1a   (  shows this probability for an allied voter. The term outside of the 
square brackets gives the probabilities of  y   ) ( y F −  floating voters being ‘allocated’ to the same (other) group 
as this allied voter. For each  y , the first (second) term inside the square brackets gives the probability that this 
voter can break (create) a tie. In the first term, all ties with  k  votes are considered. In the allied voter’s own 
group, the  k  votes consist of  i k  votes by floating voters and  i k k −  by the other allied voters. In the other 
group  i k−  ( i k k − − ) of the floating (allied) voters turn out. The first term gives the probability for each event 
( i i k k k − , , ), given the best responses. In a similar way, the second term inside the square brackets represents the 
probabilities of all events where  k  other voters in the allied voter’s own group vote and  1 + k  in the other 
group. 
  Once again, these equilibria cannot be derived analytically. Numerical estimations show that they do exist 
for  a  wide  range  of  parameter  values,  however.  Figure  A2  shows  numerical  examples  of  such 
‘ ) , , , ( f a f a q q q q -equilibria’ for a fixed electorate size  40 = E  and varying numbers of allied and floating 
voters.  The  number  of  allied  voters  per  group  is  from  the  set  } 19 ,..., 2 , , 1 { ∈ i N   and  equal  across  groups 
( B A N N = ). We present participation probabilities for allied and floating voters for voting costs  40 . = c  (upper 
left  panel),  25 . = c   (upper  right  panel),  and  10 . = c   (lower  panel).  The  figure  indicates  very  high  (low) 
participation for allied (floating) voters for both higher costs cases. Only for  10 . = c , equilibrium participation 
is in the middle range and similar for the two types. We find no equilibrium for these costs for  8 > i N .  
 
FIGURE A2:  ) , , , ( f a f a q q q q -EQUILIBIRA IN THE PU-PARTICIPATION GAME WITH ALLIED VOTERS, BINOMIAL 
GROUP SIZE DISTRBITUION,  40 = E , AND  ( ) 19 ,..., 2 , 1 ∈ = B A N N  
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Instructions for treatment UF [UM, IF, IM] 
 
Welcome to our experiment on decision-making. Depending on your own choices and the choices of other 
participants, you may earn money today. Your earnings in the experiment are expressed in tokens. 4 tokens are 
worth one Guilder. At the end of the experiment your total earnings in tokens will be exchanged into Guilders 
and paid to you in cash. The payment will remain anonymous. No other participant will be informed about your 
payment. 
 
Please remain quiet and do not communicate with other participants during the entire experiment. Raise 
you hand if you have any questions. One of us will come to you to answer them. 
 
Rounds, ‘your group’ and the ‘other group’ 
 
The experiment consists of 100 rounds. At the beginning of the experiment the computer program will randomly 
split all participants into two different populations of 12 participants. In addition, at the beginning of each round 
the computer program will randomly divide the participants in each population into two groups. The group you 
are part of will be referred to as your group and the group in your population which you are not part of will be 
called the other group. You will not know which of the participants belongs in the other group and which to 
your group. You will have nothing to do with participants in the other population in this experiment. 
 
Number of participants in ‘your group’ and the ‘other group’ 
 
At the beginning of each round the computer program will randomly determine the number of participants in 
your group and the number of participants in the other group. At no point in time will you or anybody else 
receive information about the number of participants in your group and the number of participants in 
the other group. [In IF and IM instead: You and all other participants in both groups will then receive 
information about the number of participants in your group and the number of participants in the other 
group.] 
 
However, you and all other participants know that [in IF and IM: There is the following structure of group 
sizes]: 
(1) Independent of the round, the sum of participants in both groups (your group and the other group) is always  
12. 
(2) Both groups contain a minimum of 3 participants and a maximum of 9 participants. 
 
Because the sum of participants in both groups is always twelve, there are the following 7 possible combinations 
of group sizes: 
(3-9)   (4-8)   (5-7)   (6-6)   (7-5)   (8-4)   (9-3), 
  
v 
whereby the first number represents the group size of the first group and the second number the group size of 
the second group. 
The arrangement of a population (12 participants) into two groups by the computer program proceeds in the 
following two steps: 
(1)  Both groups are randomly filled with 3 participants, the minimal number of participants per group (in total 
6 participants). Each participant has the same chance of being selected. 
(2)  Each of the remaining 6 participants is randomly put into one of the two groups, with a chance of 50% for 
each group. 
 
[For UM and IM instead: 
(1)  At the beginning of the first round both groups are randomly filled with 3 participants, the minimal number 
of participants per group (in total 6 participants). Each participant has the same chance of being selected. 
The chosen participants will be called ’FIX’-participants, because they will not change groups during the 
whole experiment. 
(2)  At the beginning of each round each of the remaining 6 participants is randomly put into one of the two 
groups,  with  a  chance  of  50%  for  each  group.  These  participants  will  be  called  ’VAR’-(=variable) 
participants, because they will randomly change groups during the whole experiment. 
 
At the beginning of the first round you will receive information about your own type FIX or VAR. Your 
own type will not change during the whole experiment.] 
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Note again that group sizes will be randomly determined at the beginning of each round. Hence, the 
group sizes may change from one round to another. 
 
Choices and earnings 
 
In each round you and all other participants will face an identical choice problem. You will be asked to make 
one choice. You can choose between the following two alternatives: 
 
•  ‘Choice A’:   no costs involved (0 tokens). 
•  ‘Choice B’:   costs are 1 token. 
 
When making your choice, nobody else in your group or in the other group will know this choice. After all 
participants have made their choices, the computer program will count the number of B-choices in your group 
and in the other group and will compare the numbers in both groups. There are 3 possible outcomes that are 
relevant for your revenue in the following way. You will receive the revenue irrespective of the choice you 
made. 
 
(1) The number of B-choices in your group exceeds the number of B-choices in the other group. In this case 
each participant in your group (including yourself) will get revenue of 4 tokens. Each participant in the 
other group will get 1 token. 
(2) The number of B-choices in your group is smaller than the number of B-choices in the other group. In this 
case each participant in your group (including yourself) will get revenue of 1 token. Each participant in the 
other group will get 4 tokens. 
(3) The number of B-choices in your group is equal to the number of B-choices in the other group. In this case 
the computer program will randomly determine the group in which each participant gets revenue of 4 tokens 
(each group has the same chance of 50% of being chosen). Each participant in the group that is not chosen 
will get 1 token.  
vi 
 
Your round earnings are calculated in the following way: round earnings = round revenue – round costs. Your 
total earnings are the sum of all of your round earnings. 
 
The following table gives your possible round earnings: 
 
Your possible round earnings: 
 
Your choice  Your group has 
more B-choices 
Your group has 
less B-choices 
Equal number of B-choices 
in both groups 
Choice A  4 tokens  1 token  4 or 1 token (50% chance each) 




The computer screen has four main windows. 
(1) The Status window shows [for UM and IM: your type (FIX or VAR),] the actual round number and the total 
earnings up to the previous round. 
(2) The Previous round window depicts the following information about the previous round: 
(a) The number of B-choices in your group [in IF and IM: and, in brackets, the size of your group]. 
(b) The number of B-choices in the other group [in IF and IM: and, in brackets, the size of the other 
group]. 
(c) Your choice. 
(d) Your revenue. 
(e) Your costs. 
(f) Your round earnings. 
Note that no information about the group sizes will be given [this sentence not for IF and IM]. 
(3) In the Choice window you will find two buttons. Press the button “Choice A” or the button “Choice B” with 
the mouse, or press the key “A” or “B”. When you have chosen you will have to wait until all participants 
have made their choices. 
(4) The Result window shows the result of the current round, hence after each participant has made a choice. 
Each yellow rectangle shown represents one B-choice of your group and each blue rectangle represents one 
B-choice of the other group. After a few seconds the result will also appear in numbers. 
 
At the top of the screen you will find a Menu bar. You can use this to access the Calculator and History 
functions. The calculator can be handled with the numerical pad on the right side of your keyboard or with the 
mouse buttons. The function ‘history’ shows all information of the last sixteen rounds as this had appeared in the 
window ‘Previous round’. At the bottom of your screen the Information bar is located. There you are told the 




Before the 100 rounds of the experiment start, we will ask you to participate in three training-rounds. You will 
have to answer questions in order to proceed further in these training-rounds. In the training-rounds you are not 
matched to other participants but to the computer program. You cannot draw conclusions about choices of 
other participants based on the results in the training-rounds. The training-rounds will not count for your 
payment. 
 
We will now start with the three trainings-rounds. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of us 








TABLE: SEQUENCE OF ELECTORAL COMPOSITIONS 
 
Round  Elect. 
comp.  Round  Elect. 
comp.  Round  Elect. 
comp.  Round  Elect. 
comp.  Round  Elect. 
comp. 
1  6-6  21  5-7  41  6-6  61  7-5  81  4-8 
2  7-5  22  6-6  42  6-6  62  7-5  82  6-6 
3  6-6  23  4-8  43  7-5  63  5-7  83  6-6 
4  5-7  24  7-5  44  6-6  64  6-6  84  6-6 
5  6-6  25  6-6  45  4-8  65  4-8  85  5-7 
6  4-8  26  9-3  46  5-7  66  5-7  86  5-7 
7  6-6  27  6-6  47  7-5  67  5-7  87  6-6 
8  7-5  28  7-5  48  7-5  68  6-6  88  8-4 
9  7-5  29  5-7  49  6-6  69  6-6  89  6-6 
10  5-7  30  5-7  50  8-4  70  5-7  90  6-6 
11  5-7  31  5-7  51  6-6  71  5-7  91  7-5 
12  7-5  32  8-4  52  5-7  72  6-6  92  6-6 
13  4-8  33  8-4  53  6-6  73  8-4  93  5-7 
14  7-5  34  6-6  54  7-5  74  5-7  94  8-4 
15  7-5  35  7-5  55  7-5  75  7-5  95  7-5 
16  8-4  36  5-7  56  4-8  76  7-5  96  3-9 
17  6-6  37  6-6  57  6-6  77  4-8  97  5-7 
18  5-7  38  5-7  58  3-9  78  5-7  98  6-6 
19  4-8  39  6-6  59  6-6  79  6-6  99  6-6 





TABLE: OVERVIEW OF EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS, OBSERVED PARTICIPATION RATES FOR ROUNDS 21 TO 100, 
AND MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE NOISE PARAMETERS 
Predictions 
(Bayesian) 
Nash  QRE 
Log-likelihood 





E0  E.4  E.8 
Estimated 




Nash  QRE  Random 
play 
UF  -  .297  .098  .302  .381    .39  5616  -4286.62  -3418.01  -3892.71 
     Allied: .426  .934  .306  .382  .05 or 1.38  2880  -4576.80  -1964.64  -1996.26 
- 
Floating: .293  .123  .299  .380    .38  2880  -2033.92  -1741.13  -1996.26  UM 
All  .359    .529**  .303**  .381**    .65  5760  -4094.34  -3761.61  -3992,53 
3  .296  .256  .306   .341     .08      54      -33.04      -32.82      -37.43 
4  .301  .173  .320   .369     .29    336    -221.73    -205.42    -232.90 
5  .329  .132  .331   .395     .39  1050    -798.61    -664.82    -727.80 
6  .481    .107*  .329  .404  4.28  2016  -2285.99  -1395.95  -1397.38 
7  .437  .091  .306  .384  1.58  1470  -1619.11  -1007.13  -1018.93 
8  .281  .080  .271  .349    .44    672    -517.75    -399.26    -465.79 
9  .241  .074  .234  .313    .43    162    -111.11      -89.41    -112.29 
IF 
All  .400    .109**  .313**  .385**    .95  5760  -5501.26  -3875.74  -3992.53 
3  .296  .256  .306   .341     .08     54      -33.04      -32.82      -37.43 
4  .286  .173  .320   .369     .22    336    -213.92    -201.02    -232.90 
5  .393  .132  .331   .395     .79  1050    -926.74    -703.73    -727.80 
6  .585    .107*  .329  .404     ∞  2016  -2731.49  -1397.38  -1397.38 
7  .448  .091  .306  .384  1.96  1470  -1658.27  -1011.05  -1018.93 
8  .341  .080  .271  .349    .74    672    -615.48    -431.12    -465.79 
9  .302  .074  .234  .313    .73    162    -136.43      -99.30    -112.29 
IM 
All  .459    .109**  .313**  .385**  2.55  5760  -6215.60  -3972.84  -3992.53 
* Or, .893; **weighted overall participation probability. 